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This paper surveys changing interrelationships between man and the earth’s forest 
cover over the past several centuries. The focus is on the interplay between population 
increase, deforestation and afforestation at both ends of Eurasia. By looking at three 
numerical  indicators—percentage  forested,  per  capita  forest  resources  and  the 
population elasticity of deforestation, Japan is compared with Lingnan, south China, 
and the East Asians with two European countries, England and France. Based on the 
East West  comparisons  and  on  somewhat  more  detailed  intra Asian  comparisons 
between China and Japan with respect to market linkages and the role of the state, the 
paper examines the proposition made by Ken Pomeranz that although both ends of 
Eurasia were ecologically constrained at the end of the early modern period, East 
Asia’s pressure on forest resources was ‘probably not much worse’ than in the West. 
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Forest History and the Great Divergence: 









Environmental  history  is  an  attempt  to  bring  environmental  factors  into 
historians’  exploration  of  the  past,  giving  emphasis  on  the  interrelationships 
between  humans  and  nature.  Forest  history  is  a  particularly  interesting 
environmental history arena for the study of their interrelationships, since forests 
are  not  simply  the  target  of  man’s  exploitation  but  resources  which  man  can 
rejuvenate by cultivating trees for either utilitarian or non utilitarian purposes. 
However, such practice of afforestation did not emerge everywhere1, and whether 
this did or did not emerge in the past must have affected humans’ standard of 
living in the present immeasurably.   
 
The standard of living is an issue that occupies a central place in a recent debate 
on the Great Divergence, inspired by the publication of Ken Pomeranz’s book on 
China and the West2. By examining the availability of forest products, he argues 
that both east and west ends of Eurasia were seriously constrained before the age 
of fossil fuels and other mineral resources, rejecting the conventional claim that it 
was  China  that  had  long  been  under  population  pressure  on  land  resources. 
However, he seems reluctant to go beyond the calculation of per capita availability 
estimates: his Great Divergence book did not raise the question of how East Asians 
                                                 
* This is a revised version of the paper read at the Harvard Hitotsubashi Warwick 
Conference on ‘Economic change around the Indian Ocean in the very long run’ held 
at the University of Warwick in Venice, Palazzo Pesaro Papafava, Venice, 22 24 July 
2008. Somewhat different versions were also presented at other meetings held in 
Leeds, Kyoto and Tokyo. The author is grateful to participants of those occasions for 
stimulating comments and informative suggestions. 
1  See for example Richards (2003). 
2  Pomeranz (2000). See also Pomeranz (2002).   4 
as well as Europeans responded to the supposedly serious timber shortage. Nor 
has any critique of his thesis picked up forestry as a topic relevant to the debate on 
the Great Divergence.3 
 
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  bridge  the  two,  i.e.,  forest  history  and  the  Great 
Divergence debate. In order to do the bridging, I shall first go over concepts and 
interpretations in forest history, and also measures that I believe are important in 
any comparative work. These are the topics of the first section. In section 2, by 
employing three numerical indicators—percentage forested, per capita forest resource 
and the population elasticity of deforestation—Japan will be compared with Lingnan, 
south China, and the East Asians with two European countries, England and France. 
Sections 3 and 4 turn, by focusing on the two East Asian countries, to the role of 
market forces and also of the state in relation to the emergence of afforestation in early 
modern and modern contexts. Finally, section 5 discusses some implications of the 
findings of the paper. 
 
1.  Concepts, interpretations and measures 
 
Concepts and interpretations 
There is a widely accepted view that the rise of a civilisation is accompanied by an 
increase in population, which after a period of balance, outstrips its material base, 
leading eventually to the destruction of the environment. This is a popular view. 
But it is worth emphasising that the view is in line with the classical Malthusian 
theory of population. Malthus himself did not refer to forest, but he could have 
easily accommodated forest in his theory of population pressure on land. Thus, 
when population grew forestland receded, while population stagnation (or decline) 
was followed by the spontaneous return of the forest; but once population increase 
became sustained, the continuous destruction of forests started.   
 
In history, we have a number of accounts by contemporaries, as well as by later day 
historians, that are not inconsistent with this interpretation. Take the Japanese 
                                                 
3  One notable exception is Warde (2006). Although the paper is not intended to be a 
critique of the Pomeranz thesis, Warde does pose a question of whether early 
modern Europe was actually approaching an environmental bottleneck.   5 
case,  for  example.  In  the  seventeenth century  when  peace  returned  after  a 
prolonged  period  of  war,  with  population  increasing,  farmland  expanding  and 
castle towns being built, the Confucian scholar Kumazawa Banzan saw a number 
of forests cut down and hills denuded. He went on to suggest that the country’s 
forest  cover  must  have  followed  a  Malthusian like  cyclical  movement 
corresponding  to  alternating  periods  of  war  and  peace,  and  to  alternating 
deceleration  and  acceleration  of  population  growth.4  If  this  would  go  on  for 
millennia, its history would never be sustainable. Indeed this is exactly what Mark 
Elvin  says  about  China,  whose  environmental  history  is  portrayed  as  ‘three 
thousand years of unsustainable growth’.5 
 
Two centuries later, when a mission led by Prince Iwakura travelled Europe, the 
official chronicler of the journey Kume Kunitake made the following observations: 
‘Before the advance of industry in Europe, in an age when people did not know 
that iron could be used in place of timber, vast woodlands were cut down and 
forests decimated in Greece, Spain, France and Britain.   
‘The level plains of Prussia, too, were once covered with extensive woodlands, 
but population increases have led to much of this being cleared to make way 
for cultivation and pastureland, so that only a quarter of the forests remain 
and trees are now increasingly rare’.6   
They  learnt that in  historic  Europe too,  there  was a  close  association  between 
man’s procreation and deforestation. 
 
On the other hand, however, what we are witnessing now in many parts of the 
world is a kind of forest rehabilitation in formerly degraded areas. The present day 
French Pyrenees, for example, is greener than in the seventeenth century.7  The 
area  of woodlands  in Great  Britain  has  doubled since  1919 when the  Forestry 
Commission was established in the government.8  Today, while deforestation is still 
going  on  in  developing  countries,  especially  in  tropical  rain  forest  areas, 
afforestation  takes  hold  in  many  developed  countries.  This  latter  phenomenon 
                                                 
4  Kumazawa Banzan, Daigaku wakumon, cited in Saito (1998), pp.140 141. 
5  Elvin (1993). 
6  Kume (2002), III, pp.209, 270. 
7  Fruhauf (1980). I owe Jean Pascal Bassino for this reference. 
8  Henderson Howat (1996).   6 
reflects,  first,  the  substitution  of  forest  and  other  organic  resources  by  a 
mineral centred  material  base  which  characterised  the  English  industrial 
revolution  in  the  late  eighteenth  century  and  the  subsequent  industrialisation 
processes in other European countries.9  The iron and steel industry is no longer a 
predator of the forest reserve, and its products are used in place of timber. This 
move eased the population pressure on the forest resource substantially. However, 
other factors were also operating in the European past. One such factor was the 
establishment of forestry as a science of resource management and rehabilitation. 
It  was  Germans  who  pioneered  in  this  field.  But  even  in  England  where 
deforestation had been taking place extensively, there grew interest which placed 
emphasis  on  the  planting  of  trees.  One  reason  was  probably  fears  of  timber 
shortage. But more importantly, there emerged a new ‘non utilitarian attitude to 
the natural world’ at the upper levels of society. Landowners and the middling sort 
of people began to see the landscape differently, which marked the beginning of the 
present day concern for forests as a component of the landscape as well as the 




This suggests that there were two somewhat different scenarios in the history of 
the  interplay  between  population  and  forests.  One  is  the  conventional  story  of 
continuous degradation, which is still a plausible story in, at least, some parts of 
the world. The other is a U shaped pattern of deforestation and afforastation. The 
latter  may  be  best  illustrated  in  a  very  long run  process  of  interrelationships 
between  population,  farmland  and  forest  areas  in  France,  probably  one  of  the 
best documented countries in the world as far as forest history is concerned (figure 
1). For the first six to seven centuries population and farmland moved in much the 
same  way,  while  forestland’s  ups  and  downs  went  in  the  opposite  direction. 
Population  increase  was  followed  by  the  clearance  of  forests,  and  hence  by  an 
increase in farmland: the cycles were Malthusian. This long period of Malthusian 
cycles  was  followed  by  a  modern  phase  of  afforestation.  As  long  as  the  early 
modern and modern periods are concerned, therefore, a U shaped pattern becomes 
                                                 
9  Wrigley (1988). 
10  Grainger (1981) and Thomas (1983).   7 
apparent. The 1990 level is a return to that of circa 1600.   
 
The U shaped pattern may be regarded as a corrective to the conventional story of 
continuous deforestation. What I would like to argue in this paper, however, is that 
two  contrasting  forces  were  at  work  in  history.  One  is  exploitation  of  natural 
forests, and the other regenerative forestry. In response to rising demand for forest 
products, an entrepreneur will go to a forest to cut down trees and bring them to 
the  market  (here  is  a  question  of  who  owns  the  forest;  and  also  involved  are 
cost benefit calculations in which geography plays a crucial part in many cases). 
When the entire hill is denuded, in this exploitative mode the entrepreneur simply 
moves on to another hill, leading to a continuous process of deforestation. In the 
regenerative  mode,  on  the  other  hand,  felling  is  combined  with  re planting;  a 
rotation system is one of its oft used methods. This allows the entrepreneur to stay 
with the original site, increasing the level of land utilisation and thus enabling him 
to maintain his market oriented silvicultural business.   
 
As the U shaped scenario suggests, there are cases where the two modes appeared 
as stages of development. However, we need not to assume that the two appeared 
always  in  succession  in  history.  There  could  be  a  time  period  in  which  both 
destabilising  and  stabilising forces  worked side  by side.  Indeed this  paper will 
show that early modern East Asia was in a forestry regime of this kind, and also 
that what took place in Japan after this phase was in sharp contrast with what 
happened in imperial China. Indeed, it is very likely that a substantial divergence 
emerged within pre modern East Asia. According to the work by Conrad Totman on 
Tokugawa Japan, there took place a significant shift from exploitation forestry to 
regenerative forestry and the turning point was the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries.11  Based on this work, John Richards concludes that ‘despite 
the rise of silvicultural knowledge and practice, only Tokugawa Japan appears to 
have  done  this  relatively  successfully—but  only  with  strict  rationing  and 
conservation measures’12. It is of particular interest, therefore, to see whether or 
not there existed significant differences between traditional China and Japan in 
terms of deforestation with respect to population growth, and if pre modern East 
                                                 
11  Totman (1989). 
12  Richards (2003), p. 622.   8 
Asian  forest  situations  were  not  much  worse,  to  explore  whether  this  was,  as 
Richards suggests, the result of stringent state regulations. That is, to ask whether 
deforestation  accelerated  or  decelerated  in  each  country  over  the  period  from 
traditional to modern times, and what forces were at work throughout the early 
modern and modern periods of the two East Asian countries. 
 
Measures 
One of Ken Pomeranz’s arguments is that in the eighteenth century, China and 
Western  Europe  at  both  ends  of  Eurasia  were  ecologically  in  serious  trouble, 
implying that it was after 1800 that both went divergent.13  One area he explored 
quantitatively is the relationship between population and forestland in Lingnan, 
China’s ‘second most commercialized and densely populated macro region’, and in 
France, a country singled out as representing Western Europe in this respect. His 
conclusion is that although both regions were ecologically constrained at the end of 
the early modern period, China’s pressure on land resources was ‘probably not 
much worse’ than in France, and more specifically that ‘with respect to trees and 
soil,  the  rate  of  decay  in  China  was  probably  slower  than  that  seen  in 
eighteenth century Europe’.14  The East West gap became apparent only when the 
West switched to resource intensive production regimes.   
 
This is a strong argument. However, I have a couple of methodological quibbles 
with his comparative analysis. One is that Pomeranz’s analysis is a straightforwar, 
two way comparison between East and West. However careful he may have been in 
the selection of areas studied, it is a dichotomous comparison, which cannot rule 
out the possibility that divergence, if any, in a pre industrial context may have 
been found, not necessarily between East and West, but also within each of the pair, 
especially within the East. The second is that Pomeranz does not explicitly relate 
this environmental question to another theoretical issue he raised with respect to 
the  question  of  the  Great  Divergence,  i.e.,  market  forces.  While  the  level  of 
commercialisation in agriculture and processing industry is extensively surveyed 
for both China and the West, no investigation is made with respect to the question 
of whether or not market forces played a part in slowing down the rate of forest 
                                                 
13  Pomeranz (2000), ch. 5. 
14  Pomeranz (2000), p. 236.   9 
degradation in East Asia. 
 
In addition, there are a couple of technical problems as well. One is a measurement 
problem. In order to assess how serious the ecological problems were, two separate 
measures  may  be  used:  average  and  sensitivity  measures.  Pomeranz  provided 
‘percent forested’ and ‘fuel supply per capita’, both of which are average measures. 
Unfortunately, however, when he talked about the ‘rate of decay’, no sensitivity 
measure was explicitly used in order to compare Chinese rates of change with 
those for France, although it is evident that in order to arrive at those average 
figures,  he  did  use  a  concept  of  numerically  defined  relationship  between 
deforestation and population increase, which is expressed as:   
⊿F  ÷⊿P, 
where F stands for forestland and P for population. When  ⊿F takes a negative 
value,  ⊿F/⊿P  indicates  lost  forest  per  additional  person.  The  use  of  this 
coefficient in his calculation implies that Pomeranz actually tried to measure, as a 
parameter,  the  sensitivity  with  which  deforestation  proceeded  with  respect  to 
population growth.   
 
However, as a sensitivity measure, elasticity is a better one. In this case, it is 
expressed as: 
(⊿F/F)÷(⊿P/P), 
which measures a per cent loss in forestland with respect to a per cent increase in 
population. Apparently the former coefficient is affected by variation in the size of 
forested  land  or  population,  or  both,  whereas  this  population  elasticity  of 
deforestation is not. 
 
The  second  problem is  concerned with  the  period  covered.  Pomeranz  looked  at 
Lingnan in the 1753 1853 period and compared the Lingnan situations with those 
in late eighteenth century France. However, the comparisons should be placed in a 
much  longer term  time  frame.  There  are  a  couple  of  reasons  for  this.  First, 
situations in a period immediately before the new era began may not be assumed 
to be representative of situations in the early modern period. Second, over the 
longer run,  the  parameter  may  have  changed.  It  is  likely  that  the  population 
elasticity would decrease with the declined level of forest cover; but it is equally   10 
likely that deforestation would accelerate, rather than decelerate, under a certain 
set of circumstances. Ideally, therefore, population elasticities should be examined 
period  by  period,  covering  the  entire  period  with  medieval,  early  modern  and 
modern times combined, thus allowing elasticity estimates to change from period 
to period.   
 
2.  Changes in population and forest cover, and their relationships 
 
This can be done, thanks to the United Nations’ Geneva Timber and Forest Study, 
for two of the European countries.15  Estimates, however crude, of both population 
and forest areas in England and France are available for several benchmark years 
from the High Middle Ages onwards. For Japan and China no medieval data are 
available,  but  calculations  can  be  made  for  both  early  modern  and  modern 
sub periods. 
 
As far as south China is concerned, figures and percentages assembled by Robert 
Marks  and  Ken  Pomeranz  about  Lingnan  provide  us  with  estimates  for  three 
benchmark years, 1700, 1853 and 1937.16  It is obvious that south China cannot 
represent the whole empire, but the size of this macro region, 39 million hectares, 
is large enough to make a comparison with Japan and other countries significant. 
Its climate and flora share the same characteristics with Japan, although Lingnan 
is a little more subtropical. Moreover, Lingnan was one of the macro regions where 
eighteenth century  population  growth  was  strongest,  which  will  make  the 
pre modern Lingnan Japan comparison particularly revealing with respect to the 
impact of population increase on the region’s forest cover. According to Marks and 
Pomeranz, the forested area was 18,300,000 hectares in 1700, which declined to 
2,900,000 hectares in 1937. During the same period, population is estimated to 




For Japan after the mid nineteenth century, there are two series of data. One is 
                                                 
15  UN Economic Commission for Europe (1996). 
16  Marks (1998) and Pomeranz (2000).   11 
government land statistics and the other geographers’ estimates by using a 2 km 
mesh on the Geographical Survey Institute’s successive 1 to 50 thousand scale 
maps.  The  government  statistics  is  yearly  but  subject  to  frequent  changes  in 
definition and category. The geographers’ are compiled by Yukio Himiyama and his 
associates, available only for benchmark years of 1850, 1900, 1950 and 1985. Their 
results, especially those for prewar years, give us substantially larger forest area 
estimates than the government’s forestry statistics. But Himiyama’s methods are 
systematic and mutually consistent, so changes that actually took place in land use 
are  likely  to  be  better  reflected  in  the  Himiyama  series  than  in  government 
statistics which are said to have been affected by frequent changes in definition 
and category. Also, the Himiyama estimates start with the end of the Tokugawa 
period.  Since  the  government  statistics  began  in  the  Meiji  period,  this  is  of 
considerable merit. For the period after 1850, therefore, the Himiyama estimates 
will be used. They give 24,818,000 hectares for the forested area today, which is 
only slightly smaller than that of 25,497,000 hectares estimated for 1850 (see table 
1, upper panel). 
 
For earlier periods, no such estimates are available. However, a cursory look at the 
Tokugawa historiography reveals that there were two areas in which important 
moves took place. One is in the supply of timber. There is evidence that the period 
of  1570 1670  saw  a  vast  number  of  trees  depleted  since  the  demand  for 
construction  timber  was  strong  in  that  period  of  population  growth  and  town 
building.  After  the  late  seventeenth  century  came  an  age  in  which  plantation 
forestry was established. Increasingly trees, especially conifers, were planted in 
cut over  places,  felled  forty  to  fifty  years  later,  then  sold  at  the  market.  This 
county wide  emergence  of  regenerative  forestry  implies  that  the  proportion 
forested declined during the seventeenth century but returned to the initial level 
by the end of the Tokugawa period.17   
 
The other story is concerned with agriculture. The period of timber depletion was 
coincided with that of land reclamation. Most of arable fields created during this 
period were found in marshy flood plains, implying that reclamation itself was not 
                                                 
17  Totman (1989) and Saito (1998).   12 
associated with the clearing of forests.18  However, recent case studies have shown 
that  peasants  did  clear  the  wood  on  the  village  common  in  order  to  create 
grassland  for  collecting  a  vast  amount  of  grasses.  The  grasses  were  put  into 
compost,  mixed  with  cattle  excrement  and  used  as  fertiliser.  This  type  of 
home made fertiliser, widespread in western provinces, played a significant role in 
yield growth but caused the denudation of village owned hills. No return of the 
wood occurred in those grasslands since peasants kept using the commons for that 
purpose.19  Himiyama and others give an estimate of 4.4 million hectares for ‘rough 
land’ in 1850, showing that the area consisted of village commons used for grass 
cutting  as  well  as  fuel  gathering,  fields  used  for  sifting  cultivation,  completely 
denuded forest areas and other types of ‘rough land’.20  It is difficult to determine 
exactly what proportion of the 4.4 million hectares had been converted from the 
‘forest’  category  to  the  grassland  type  of  village  commons  since  the  early 
seventeenth century, but an assumption may be made that as much as one third of 
this total ‘rough land’ area in 1850 had been wooded in 1600.   
 
All this gives us an estimate of 27 million hectares for Japan’s forest area at the 
beginning of the seventeenth century. Given the nature of the evidence we have, 
this  estimate  is  probably  on  the  high  side.  For  the  corresponding  figure  of 
population I choose 17 million, which is substantially larger than Akira Hayami’s 
widely accepted estimate of 12 million.21  According to my estimates, therefore, the 
degree of deforestation during the period up to 1850 is probably overstated and 
that of population increase somewhat understated. In other words, it should be 
noted, the population elasticity of deforestation calculated from these figures is 
likely to have an upward bias.   
 
Let  us  now  have  a  look  at  the  average  measures  of  deforestation  for  the  four 
countries. Tables 2 and 3 set out the proportion of forests to the total land area and 
the  forestland  per  capita.  Both  tables  broadly  confirm  that  both  England  and 
France exhibit a U shaped curve. For East Asia, since the time period covered is 
                                                 
18  Saito (1998). 
19  Isoda (1996). See also Chiba (1991) and Mizumoto (2005). 
20  Nishikawa et al. (1995), pp.4, 78 79. 
21  Reported in Miyamoto (2004), p.38.   13 
short, it is difficult to identify a long run trend; seemingly Lingnan’s is continuous 
deforestation, while Japan exhibits long run stability. 
 
[Table 2; Table 3] 
 
In addition, there are some more findings that merit attention. First, forest cover 
in the British Isles of the High Middle Ages was already much thinner than on the 
European continent. The proportion of wooded land in England at the time of the 
Domesday  Survey  was  15  per  cent,  which  declined  to  10  per  cent  in  the 
mid fourteenth  century  and  further  to  8  per  cent  in  1688,  while  the  French 
percentage for 1000 was 47 percent and even in 1700 it stood at 15 per cent. This 
impression is confirmed by a recent account by Paul Warde that at the end of the 
sixteenth century, the proportion was one third on continental European countries 
of  France,  German speaking  areas,  Bohemia  and  Poland,  with  the  Danish 
proportion being one quarter, whereas the figure was 12 per cent for Ireland, 6 7 
per cent for England, and 4 per cent for Scotland.22  It is difficult to know to what 
extent these differences were a historical consequence of the Saxon invasion, and 
to  what  extent  explained  by  the  British  Isles’  climatic  or  geological  conditions. 
Whichever  the  explanation,  it  is  evident  that  there  were  already  substantial 
differences in the initial conditions within medieval Europe.   
 
Second, Lingnan’s early modern level of 1.6 hectare forestland per capita comes 
between the medieval English and French levels, and its mid nineteenth century 
value of 0.3 hectares in the middle the early modern English and French levels. In 
terms of the proportion forested, moreover, Lingnan in the mid nineteenth century 
was clearly higher than the French level at the beginning of the eighteenth century. 
These  findings,  while  not  entirely  consistent  with  Richards’  account  of  China’s 
forest  cover  steadily  disappearing  during  the  late  imperial  period23,  seem  to 
support  Pomeranz’s  claim  that  in  the  eighteenth  century  China’s  ecological 
situations were ‘probably not much worse’ than in France.   
 
Third, however, somewhat different contrasts emerge if we turn to changes over 
                                                 
22  Warde (2006), p.34. 
23  Richards (2003), ch. 4.   14 
time. In the long history of deforestation, the largest reduction in forest cover of 
both England and France occurred before the end of the seventeenth century, not 
in  the  eighteenth  century,  nor  in  the  subsequent  century  of  industrialisation. 
Indeed, it is not coincidence that John Nef argued that there occurred the ‘timber 
famine’  in  the  sixteenth  and  early  seventeenth  centuries.  The  pan European 
shortage of timber and firewood drove prices of those forest products relative to 
those of other commodities, which eventually led to the substitution of coal for 
wood  in  the  subsequent  centuries. 24   In  contrast,  the  tempo  of  Lingnan’s 
deforestation  became  faster  during  the  late  nineteenth  and  early  twentieth 
centuries than in the earlier period. Ways in which deforestation proceeded during 
the early modern period were thus different. 
 
Fourth, Japan’s initial level of forest cover was high, over 70 per cent, and exhibits 
little  change  in  the  subsequent  four century  period.  The  proportion  forested  in 
1985 still stood at 67 per cent. Its per capita forestland, on the other hand, displays 
a  steady  decline  as  population  increased.  Taken  together,  it  suggests  that  the 
relationships  between  population  change  and  deforestation  were  somewhat 
different from those operating in the other countries.   
 
This final point leads us to examine our third measure, population elasticity of 
deforestation, which measures the sensitivity of decline in the forest area with 
respect to population increase. The elasticity of  0.1, for example, implies that a 10 
per cent increase in population was followed by a mere 1 per cent decline in the 
forest area; on the other hand, a much higher elasticity of  1.0 means that a 10 per 
cent increase in population resulted in a 10 per cent loss of forest cover. Unlike the 
previous  two  tables,  the  calculation  is  made  for  the  intervals  between  all  the 
benchmark years indicated in appendix tables. From table 4 and figure 2, three 
observations can be made. 
                                                 
24  Nef (1932), I, pp.156 164. There can be no doubt that fears of wood shortage were 
expressed across the regions of early modern Europe. However, that fact should not 
be taken to imply that Europe was approaching an ecological exhaustion already at 
the end of, say, the sixteenth century (for a survey of the ‘reality of the woodland’ in 
seventeenth  and eighteenth century European states, see Warde 2006). What the 
evidence presented in this paper indicates is simply that the pace with which forests 
were felled exceeded the rate of population increase far greater in the early modern 
than in the modern period.   15 
 
[Table 4; Figure 2] 
 
First, the pattern of change over the second millennium is surprisingly similar for 
both England and France. True, there are some noticeable differences between the 
two graphs, such as more serious forest degradation taking place early in modern 
England than in France in the same period, eighteenth century deceleration in 
deforestation being more marked in England than in France, and France’s drive for 
re forestation more intensive than in England in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. However, it is also true that these differences look minor if compared 
with  the  broad  pattern  of  change:  that  there  occurred  an  acceleration  of 
degradation in the early modern period, but deforestation became less serious in 
the eighteenth century. This was probably the end product of various forces such as 
state  regulation,  imports  from  Norway  and  Baltic  countries,  and  the  increased 
application of scientific forestry. The latter move began in the eighteenth century, 
which eventually led to an increase in forest yields and the advance of afforestation 
from the nineteenth century onwards.25 
 
Second,  table  2  and  figure  2  confirm  that  deforestation  in  eighteenth century 
China  was  not  much  worse  than  in  Western  Europe  in  the  same  period.  In 
elasticity terms, too, the Chinese level comes in between the English and French 
levels in the eighteenth century. As Pomeranz argued, the ‘great divergence’ took 
place  after  this  stage.  However,  it  should  be  noted  that  as  for  Europe,  the 
eighteenth century levels were not a good indicator of what was happening in the 
early modern period. In the eighteenth century, Europe was in transit from the 
stage  of  deforestation  to  that  of  afforestation.  For  Lingnan,  south  China, 
unfortunately, it is not possible to extend the calculation of elasticities back into 
periods before 1700. However, Marks’s study on Lingnan shows that there were 
close  links  between  population  growth,  the  expansion  of  food  base  and  the 
clearance of forests, suggesting that if two of the three are known, conjecture may 
be made about the third. According to his estimates, both population growth and 
arable expansion between 1700 and 1853 were fastest in the entire period since the 
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end  of  the  fourteenth  century.  The  rates  of  increase  in  the  period  up  to  the 
mid seventeenth century were modest, while during the Ming Qing transition the 
arable area increased only marginally and population even decreased.26  It is very 
likely, therefore, that the elasticities had remained modest from the Song to the 
early  Qing,  and  hence,  that  there  had  been  neither  an  acceleration  nor  a 
deceleration in deforestation during the period up to 1700.   
 
Third, just as percentages forested did, the Japanese elasticities too seem to fit 
with  the  pattern  of  long run  stability.  However,  this  does  not  mean  that  the 
original flora was kept intact, nor does it suggest that trees and shrubs native to 
the particular forest site were well protected. The stability in the level of forest 
cover was never a product of any conservationist policies or cultural beliefs. Forest 
tree  species  did  change  substantially  as  plantation  forests  advanced.  Broadly 
speaking, the  change was from  broad leaves  to  conifers. Today,  there  are more 
plantations of sugi (Cryptomeria japonica) and hinoki (Japanese cypress) than in 
the beginning of the Tokugawa period.27   
 
The paucity of numerical data for Tokugawa Japan does not allow us to break down 
by sub period, but the consensus is that there were two periods of deforestation 
throughout the four century period since 1600. The first was in the seventeenth 
century. Literary sources strongly suggest that from circa 1570 to 1670, there was 
a timber shortage and the destruction of forests took place all over the country, 
with  numerous  reports  of  erosion  and  flooding  and  of  village versus village, 
district versus district disputes flared up by such environmental hazards. Yet it 
should be remembered that even the very low elasticity of  0.09, estimated for the 
entire Tokugawa period, was somewhat overstated. This implies either that the 
degree of seventeenth century forest degradation was comparatively less serious, 
or that the tempo of re forestation in the subsequent period was substantially fast, 
or both.28  The second period of deforestation was in the late nineteenth century 
when industrial demands for firewood increased. But the degree of acceleration in 
this period was considerably modest compared with early modern European and 
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with modern Chinese deforestation. Moreover, from about 1900 Japan entered a 
stage in which the rate of felling trees exceeded that of planting trees. Apparently 
modern Japan took a path different from the Chinese path.   
 
3.  Market linkage: the common denominator in early modern East Asia 
 
The tripartite comparison of Japan, China and the West has made it clear that 
there were more contrasts than similarities. Contrasts among the countries were 
found not only in modern but also in traditional times; contrasts emerged within 
East Asia as well as between East and West. So the question is: what are the 
factors  affecting  these  differential  courses?  More  precisely,  what  factors  made 
Japan’s historical pattern so different from China’s and from Western Europe’s 
pattern?   
 
One obvious factor is agriculture, for in earlier stages of development, as we saw in 
the  French  case  (figure  1  above),  population  increase,  forest  clearance  and the 
expansion  of  farmland  were  closely  linked.  Undoubtedly,  this  also  played  a 
considerable  role  in  Lingnan  in  the seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries.  The 
strong growth of population was accompanied by internal migration flows, which 
meant, in most cases, clearing forests on hillsides and in mountains. In Japan too, 
the seventeenth century saw an increase in population and in land reclamation. 
On the face of it, this suggests, as Totman did,29  that this direct link between 
population and the clearance of woodland was at work in early Tokugawa Japan. 
However, as we have already seen, the seventeenth century expansion of farmland 
was made possible chiefly by converting low lying, marshy areas in river deltas 
into  paddy  fields.30  The  only  negative  factor  that  was  operating  in  relation  to 
agricultural  growth  in  this  period  was,  as  we  have  also  seen,  the  clearance  of 
woodlands near villages in the western provinces.31  On balance, however, the loss 
of forests caused by the push of settlement frontiers into mountains must have 
been relatively insignificant in the case of seventeenth century Japan.   
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Another factor is demand for forest resources, timber and fuel, which could act as a 
factor  stimulating  domestic  regenerative  forestry.  It  is  evident  that  in  modern 
Western  Europe  both  state  initiative  and  market  forces  are  operating  in  that 
process.32  In pre modern China and Japan, it was primarily market forces that 
were at work in making provisions for the domestic needs for timber and fuel. On 
occasion the market acted as an agent of exploitative felling, leading to massive 
deforestation. It was more likely to happen in areas where topography was not 
favourable  for  the  spontaneous  regrowth  of  the  forest,  such  as  granite  hills  in 
Mediterranean Greece and in Japan’s Inland Sea coast, especially when large scale 
construction works such as the building of new palaces, castles and towns were 
carried out. However, under some circumstances the market could also act as a 
stimulus to the emergence of regenerative forestry.   
 
Tokugawa Japan 
Take the Tokugawa case first. There is much evidence that as population expanded 
and  towns  grew,  old growth stands were  extensively logged  in the  seventeenth 
century.  Forests  after forests were  cleared to supply  the materials for  building 
castle towns. As Kumazawa Banzan lamented, ‘eight out of ten mountains of the 
realm have been denuded’33, although what he actually meant must have been that 
‘eight out of ten accessible mountains have been denuded’. One consequence of this 
building  boom  was  ecological  degradation;  judging  from  edicts  and  ordinances 
issued  by  the  Tokugawa  government  in  the  late  seventeenth  century,  serious 
erosions and floods must have taken place in various parts of the country. At the 
same time, it should be noted, many mountain districts responded to the shortage 
of timber created by this boom, first by felling natural forests, then eventually by 
introducing a regenerative forestry as an economically viable business pursuit.   
 
By the 1710s, a number of provinces became known as market oriented suppliers 
of timber to metropolises such as Kyoto, Osaka, Nagoya and Edo. With this move, 
two  different  types  of  forestry  districts  emerged34.  One  was  a  type  of  forestry 
dependent largely on spontaneous rejuvenation of the forest. This was possible 
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only where forest areas were substantially large and government regulations such 
as  banned  access  and  rationing  were  tight  and  effective.  Kiso,  Hida,  Akita, 
Tsuruga and Tosa are its notable examples, most of which were large and powerful 
daimyo  territories  located  in  rather  remote  provinces  in  the  north east  or  the 
south west. The other type was privately managed plantation forestry, in which 
more emphasis was given to replanting and rotation. This entrepreneurial type of 
market oriented timber production was mostly found in privately owned forests 
surrounding  the  metropolises.  The  district  of  Ome,  for  example,  was  in  Edo’s 
hinterland  while  Yoshino  and  Tanba  targeted  the  Osaka  and  Kyoto  markets. 
According to an analysis of early Meiji silvicultural reports sent from prefectures35, 
intensive afforestation management at the beginning of Meiji rule was found in 
regions between the Tanba Yoshino line to the line connecting the Kuzuryu to the 
Tenryu River, and also in an area from Oku Tama to Chichibu. The former area 
served collectively as a supply zone to the metropolitan markets of Kyoto, Osaka 
and Nagoya, while the latter was a hinterland of the Edo market. And the former 
was far larger in size than the latter. All these are practices found on private land. 
In the rest, therefore, daimyo controlled forestry was predominant, although even 
within  that  category  commercially oriented  areas  dependent  on  spontaneous 
regeneration should be distinguished from those where no systematic replanting 
was carried out. 
 
Yoshino led the way to regenerative forestry in the private sector. Records show 
that  afforestation  in  this  area  started  on  mountain  sites  formerly  used  for 
slush and burn farming in the mid seventeenth century, and it gained momentum 
from the turn of the century onwards36. There is evidence that in this type of the 
market oriented timber trade no particular intervention was made by the local 
daimyo government, and that commission rates asked by metropolitan merchants 
were not excessive. According to a case study of Tanba, a transit tax collected at a 
river landing by the local government was 5 per cent on each raft37. In the case of 
Yoshino, the tax imposed by the Wakayama government was 10 per cent while the 
commission rates were much lower—3 per cent in Wakayama and 1 per cent in 
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Osaka38. During the latter half of the Tokugawa period, therefore, forestry output 
in  the  entrepreneurial  sector  near  the  metropolitan  markets  must  have  grown 




Of  the  metropolitan markets, Osaka occupied  a  central  place  in  the  Tokugawa 
period as it was on the top of the country’s distribution networks. There is a trade 
statistics for 1714, which enables us to examine the composition of Osaka imports 
shipped from various provinces of the country.40  Since the 1714 statistics covered 
all the merchandise produced in rural provinces as commodities for Osaka (thus 
excluding  tax  rice  sent  by  daimyo  authorities  themselves),  table  5  indirectly 
indicates the relative importance of the timber trade to other trades in the early 
eighteenth  century.  Not  surprisingly  rice  and  other  agricultural  products 
constituted the largest group, i.e., 39 per cent; next to the agricultural produce 
came two groups of commodities, i.e., clothing and forest goods of timber, firewood 
and charcoal, constituting 11 and 13 per cent respectively of the total value of 
imports. Of the latter group, timber outweighed firewood and charcoal (9 and 4 per 
cent respectively). On the face of it, the levels of these percentages do not seem to 
have  been  particularly  high,  but  it  should  be  realised  that  much  of  rural 
non agricultural pursuits such as weaving and logging was done by village farm 
populations as by employments. By the early eighteenth century, therefore, the 
1714 trade statistics suggests that timber, firewood and charcoal as well as textile 
fabrics had already been established as important commodities marketed in the 
metropolis. According to the 1736 statistics of a similar, though less comprehensive 
kind,41  timber came not only from districts surrounding Osaka, but from remote 
north eastern and south western provinces as well. This suggests that at this stage 
the share of timber shipped from daimyo controlled forestry districts was still large, 
while judging from early Meiji statistics, timber imports from privately run conifer 
plantations  around  Osaka  and  Kyoto,  such  as  those  in  Tanba,  Yoshino  and 
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Kumano, as well as firewood and charcoal imports from similar districts, increased 
substantially faster than from the daimyo owned forestry areas in the subsequent 
periods42. Indeed, according to the Tanba study, there was a four fold increase in 
the supply of timber: the annual total of rafts floated down the river is estimated to 
have been from 600 to 800 in the 1670s; two centuries later the number increased 
to a level of 3,000.43 
 
The advance of plantation forestry became possible as importing foreign timber 
was not an option in Tokugawa Japan where the economy was virtually closed to 
international trade. There is evidence that this new type of forestry was regarded 
by  contemporaries  as  commercially  viable.  A  look  at  farm  and  silvicultural 
manuals and encyclopaedias, published in increasing numbers from the turn of the 
seventeenth  century,  reveals  that  the  writers  encouraged  commercially  minded 
rural  entrepreneurs  to  cultivate  sugi  (cryptomeria)  and  hinoki  (cypress)  as 
demands for construction timber remained strong. They argued that prices of good 
timber in metropolitan markets would rise more than proportionally to the size of 
timber, and that such buoyant market prices would justify the increased input of 
labour and capital in a plantation business whose gestation period tended to be as 
long as 20 years or even more. The manual writers thus provided entrepreneurs 
with techniques and general know hows in forest management. Similar market 
linkages were, though to a much lesser extent, found for the cultivation of firewood 
as  towns’  demand  for charcoal  and  firewood increased  in the  latter  half  of  the 
Tokugawa period.44 
 
A few more remarks may be made in relation to the emergence of market oriented 
forestry. First, an impression derived from the Yoshino and Tanba case studies is 
that merchants in the forestry district were involved in plantation management as 
well as logging and transport. Given the long gestation period in forestry, the cost 
of financial provisioning must have been substantial for them. At this stage, it is 
difficult to know exactly to what extent their activities were self financed, and how 
they were financed when borrowing became necessary. In this respect, however, it 
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is interesting to note that a general tendency of interest rate levels in urban money 
markets was on the decline—in the case of loans to daimyo—from 12 13 per cent in 
the first half of the eighteenth to about 8 per cent in the mid nineteenth century. 
Tokugawa Japan’s success in regenerative forestry may, therefore, be placed in the 
evolution of capital markets45.   
 
Second, the case of Yoshino suggests that regenerative forestry raised the level of 
land  utilisation  as  well  as  that  of  labour  intensity.  When  afforestation  started 
there as a commercially viable industry, a cultivation system of 20 years’ cycle was 
introduced to enable foresters to harvest as early as possible. In the subsequent 
period,  however,  the  cycle  was  lengthened  to  produce  better quality,  hence 
better priced  timber,  with  a  more  labour intensive  technique  which  combined 
dense  planting  with  more  frequent  thinning out.  A  result  of  this  shift  was  a 
substantial  increase  in  land  productivity 46 .  Like  intensive  agriculture  that 
progressed over the same time period, forestry became labour intensive as well as 
land intensive.  The  advance  was  thus  Boserupian,  and  it  was  this  advance  in 
productivity that gave a competitive advantage to the entrepreneurial sector, in 
which  the  average  size  of  cultivation  area  was  undoubtedly  smaller  than  the 




Third, moreover, the macro economic significance of this productivity advance may 
be  estimated  by  looking  at  relative  price  movements  of  forest  products. 
Unfortunately, no price data exist for earlier periods when timber shortage was 
still  substantial:  the  data  become  available  only  from  1785  for  firewood  and 
charcoal and from 1838 for timber, so that it is not possible for us to substantiate 
the wood shortage thesis for early Tokugawa Japan in such a manner as European 
early modernists did with price data. Even with such short time series, however,, it 
is worth examining how prices of forest products were compared with the general 
price  index  and  that  of  raw  silk,  the  best  performer  of  all  commodities  in  the 
Tokugawa period. Figure 3 shows that changes in the silk price index relative to 
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the general price index were generally on the decrease (except in the final period of 
1854 65).  It  implies  that  raw  silk  became  cheaper  in  comparison  with  other 
commodities, suggesting that its production base in the countryside expanded and 
its productivity increased more than demand for silk increased47. We do not know 
exactly  how  the  demand  for  silk  changed,  but  judging  from  the  stability  of 
population and gradualness in economic growth in the period before the opening of 
the Treaty ports in 1859, the supply side was the determinant of this relative price 
series. Also noteworthy is that, as far as the period between 1785 and 1854 is 
concerned, the relative price curves for raw silk and forest products moved more or 
less together, suggesting that if earlier data had been available, the graphs for 
timber, firewood and charcoal must have behaved in much the same way as for raw 
silk. In other words, there took place productivity growth in forestry too and it was 




Much  has  been  said  about  historic  China  being  a  case  of  continuous  forest 
degradation. Empirically, however, evidence is not quite robust yet. In this respect, 
Li Bozhong’s work on Jiangnan is invaluable. Having examined various effects of 
the development of the Lower Yangzi economy, he maintains that its growth was 
both stimulant to and constrained by the timber trade with local economies of 
Fujian,  Hebei,  Hunan,  Sichuan,  Guizhou  and  Yunnan.  Overall,  he  argues,  the 
latter  effect  outweighed  the  former  as  reflected  in  rising  prices  of  timber  in 
Jiangnan48. 
 
However,  there  is  some  evidence  that  afforestation  was  being  practised.  For 
example, Li shows that some of the regions mentioned above had already practised 
regenerative  forestry  from  early  times,  while  Robert  Marks  notes  by  quoting 
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Gottlieb  Fenzel,  a  German  forestry  expert,  that  while  much  of  northern 
Guangdong had became ‘vast stretches of flat, barren hills’ by the early twentieth 
century, ‘the Yao tribesmen who Fenzel observed had taken to replanting trees 
after they moved on; but the Chinese did not do so then and probably had not in 
earlier times either’.49  It seems true that ethnic minorities such as the Miao as 
well as the Yao played a prominent role in the timber trade from early periods in 
south China,50  and recent studies of documents concerning the Miao of Guizhou 
and  their  cultivation  of  Cunninghamia,  a  coniferous  tree  used  as  construction 
timber, suggest that their timber trade was a sustainable business. The forestry 
district  of  Qingshui jiang,  south eastern  Guizhou,  in  the  eighteenth  century 
started to cultivate Cunninghamia for urban markets in the Lower Yangzi and also 
established links with the public sector procurement of the building material for 
the  palace  in  Beijing.51  For  these  commercial  links,  both  local  Miao speaking 
merchants and city based Han Chinese dealers played an equal part, making the 
timber trade sustainable and keeping replanting commercially viable.   
 
All this may give an impression that market oriented afforestation was practised 
only by minority people but never by Han Chinese. Indeed, among several types of 
forestry  in  traditional  China  examined  by  Menzies,  logging  operations  in  deep 
mountains  organised  by  Chinese  merchants  was  probably  the  most 
straightforward, as well as the most exploitative, form of market activity.52  Han 
settlers in the Yangzi highlands (called pengmin or shack people) are also said to 
have led to environmental degradation as they usually cleared woods on hill slopes 
to  convert  them to  fields for maize,  causing soil  erosion  downstream.53  On  the 
other hand, however, there is evidence that the ways in which the woodland was 
managed  in  the  Miao speaking  area  of  Guizhou  were  not  different  from  those 
found for forestry districts in Huizhou. According to the study by Mio Kishimoto of 
both Guizhou and Huizhou contract documents,54  it seems certain that over the 
entire late imperial period China’s forestry was in private hands. In the private 
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sector, as in Tokugawa Japan, it was local merchants who managed forests as well 
as the distribution of timber. Hill owners, rarely involved in the cultivation of trees, 
received a share of proceeds from the sale of trees at the end of the cultivation cycle. 
One difference with Tokugawa Japan is that the Chinese relation between the hill 
owner and the merchant was somewhat more businesslike. The contract was for 
one cultivation cycle. In most cases, it was another merchant who signed in for the 
next cycle, but at the same time, there is no indication that such high turnover 
caused any instability in the trade. The planter’s share was one third in most cases. 
Although the share of a half was not rare, the tendency seems to have been for the 
planter’s share to decrease, rather than to increase. Again, this is probably not a 
reflection  of  planters’  worsening  bargaining  position,  but  of  a  tendency  for  the 
planters to earn extra incomes by cultivating crops such as millet and sesame.55 
Thus,  as  Nicholas  Menzies  says,  Cunninghamia  cultivation  was  probably  the 
‘longest lived, most resilient example of forest management’.   
 
Outside this commercial sector of forestry, there was another regime: woodland 
owned  and  carefully  maintained  by  the corporate community.  Although  not for 
commercial  purposes,  as  the  Huizhou  case  shows,56  the  woodland  was  kept 
maintained  and  harvested  regularly  by  the  lineage  group  to  earn  income  for 
maintaining the ancestral halls and for other purposes. Villages and temples also 
maintained woods in a similar manner. Forest management of this kind, therefore, 
must have contributed to slow down the long run rate of depletion.57  As far as 
south  China  in  the  period  before  the  mid nineteenth  century  is  concerned, 
therefore, the ways in which market demand was translated into the practice of 
regenerative forestry were probably also similar to those found in Tokugawa Japan. 
In  this  sense,  as  Mark  Elvin  says,  ‘the  cultivation  of  trees  could  be  a  form  of 
premodern high tech’.58  In other words, in imperial China too, both destabilising 
and stabilising forces were at work side by side, although all the evidence so far 
examined seems to suggest that the performance of market oriented plantation 
forestry was somewhat better in Tokugawa Japan than in Qing China.. 
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Thus, long run trends are determined by the outcome of whether or not the rate of 
depletion was lower than the rate of renewal. Once the former exceeded the latter, 
the pressure to harvest immature trees would start ‘a downward spiral’. Such a 
cash in imperative was a product of market forces. However, Elvin does note that a 
phase of environmental degradation in the commercial plantation sector ‘did not 
become  clearly  established  until  the  eighteenth  and  the  nineteenth  centuries’. 
According  to  him,  one  critical  factor  in  plantation  managers’  cost benefit 
calculations  was  the  theft  of  wood,  which  ‘became  a  widely  prevalent  scourge, 
which inhibited production by small producers with inadequate means to defend 
themselves;  and  market  pressures  probably  tended  to  compel  not  only  a 
concentration  on  cultivating  quick growing  species  but  also  sales  of  relatively 
immature  trees  as  soon  as  a  profit  could  be  taken’.59  Such  crimes  presumably 
increased in various parts of the empire towards the end of the Qing and beyond. 
In the case of village and clan forests also, Menzies notes that their disappearance 
did  not  accelerate  before  the  1911  revolution.60  Thus,  the  real  cause  of  the 
‘downward spiral’ that is believed to have taken place in the late Qing and in the 
Republican period would probably be found in the area of ‘law and order’ rather 
than in the market sphere.   
 
4.  The role of the state: divergence in modern East Asia 
 
‘Law and order’ is one of the issues closely associated with the ‘role of the state’ 
question. As long as what economists call ‘externalities’ exists to environmental 
issues,  we  cannot  leave  the  issues  entirely  to  the  market.  And  since  much  of 
forestland was owned by the state and the procurement of forest resources made 
for  the  state,  some  kinds  of  regulations  and  institution  building  carry  prime 
importance. Just as the Tokugawa shogunate and local daimyo did, the state could 
control forest resources with banned entry or access, thus allowing the area to 
regenerate eventually, or by issuing edicts to regulate usage of forest products. The 
latter is interpreted by John Richards as constituting ‘a system of public rationing 
that seems to have has some impact’. In villages, peasants developed their own 
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rules  to  regulate  access  to  firewood,  green  fertiliser  and  fodder,  which  also 
‘constituted a system of rationing’.61  However, what the Tokugawa state did was 
not  just  strict  rationing.  Indeed,  a  careful  reading  of  Totman’s  The  Green 
Archipelago reveals that institution building in the state sector was the key in 
accounting for, if not the real cause of, the rise of regenerative forestry in response 
to  the  growth  of  market  demand,  hence  for  Tokugawa  Japan’s  record  in  forest 
management in general, for which the state played a part.62   
 
Throughout history, however, the state has not always been a reliable agent of 
control,  maintenance  and  management  with  respect  to  forests.  In  fact,  in  his 
discussion  of  temple  and  monastic  forest  conservation,  Menzies  contends  that 
imperial  policies  of  successive  Chinese  dynasties  were  inconsistent.  National 
interests  often  took  precedence  over  concern  for  forests.  Prohibitions  could  be 
followed by state initiated incentives to colonisation and land clearance, while in 
the  area  of  commercially  oriented  plantation  forestry  state  intervention,  be 
restrictive or market friendly, seems to have been minimal.63  On the other hand, 
the Tokugawa shogunate’s policies were less inconsistent. But in the case of Japan, 
probably more important than the attitudes of this central government was what 
took  place  at  regional  levels.  In  the  Tokugawa  decentralised  system,  the  local 
daimyo  government  was  increasingly  interested  in  forest  management—as  a 
public body in charge of the prevention of erosions and flooding and as a fiscal body 
in want of new sources of revenue. What emerged in many parts of the country 
during the eighteenth century was an agreement between the daimyo government 
and local farmer entrepreneurs or village officials. One form called nenki yama 
was simply a fixed term lease contract between the two parties. Another form, 
which  as  institution  building  proved  to  be  more  important,  was  to  share  the 
harvest  on  the  daimyo owned  forestland.  It  was  called  ‘shared yield  forest’ 
(buwake yama  in  Tokugawa  terminology),  another  kind  of  lease  arrangement 
under which it was the lessee who planted trees and sell the tree products at the 
market.64  The  contract  was  for  one  tree  generation,  but  was  in  most  cases 
                                                 
61  Richards (2003), p.185. 
62  Totman (1989), especially ch.7. 
63  Menzies (1994), pp.91 92. 
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renewable. It seems that the planter’s share of the harvest gradually increased as 
the eighteenth century progressed, from a level below a half to the fifty fifty mark, 
and from that fifty fifty mark to a level above a half65. It is interesting to note here 
that the general level of planters’ share was higher in Tokugawa Japan than in 
imperial south China, and that it was on the increase rather than the decrease. 
Apparently, this Tokugawa system provided an incentive to the local entrepreneur 
to expand the cultivation of trees the market wanted by making a deal with the 
local government with respect to the state owned forestland. The emerging system 
proved to be effective, giving the local government revenues and the local people a 
stable source of profits, by keeping forest areas replanted. In other words, this can 
be regarded as a decentralised way in which the state exercised its influence in 
maintaining the nation’s forest cover. 
 
Another pronounced difference between China and Japan seem to have emerged 
after the demise of the old regime. Given the magnitude of population elasticity for 
Lingnan from 1853 to 1937, and given the possibility that troubles in the ‘law and 
order’ area increased over time, it seems likely that the entire system of resource 
control  and  management  started  to  crumble  during  the  late  Qing Republican 
period.66  In contrast, Japan’s new Meiji government took a much firmer stance on 
forest management. Part of the reason for that stance is found in what the Iwakura 
mission of the 1870s learnt from the West. After noting how seriously forests were 
under attack in the European past, the chronicler Kume added that: 
‘It was in light of this [state of forest degradation] that forestry systems were 
subsequently  promoted  so  that  nowadays,  while  liberal  politics  are 
increasingly practised in Europe, in forestry laws alone the freedoms of former 
times are actually being curtailed.67 
And, after the Prussian visit, he noted: 
As a result, laws have recently been introduced to protect the forests, and the 
government  has  been  making  intensive  efforts  to  plant  large  quantities  of 
                                                                                                                                          
(1959), parts 3 4. 
65  Shioya (1959), p.101. Despite this tendency, the most common of all observed 
cases was a fifty fifty share, closer to that found for the rice tax level in farming. 
66  As I am no specialist in Chinese history I simply await future research by experts 
in this field. 
67  Kume (2002), III, p.209.   29 
saplings during the felling season.68 
They learnt that the government should take the initiative in forest management. 
Subsequently,  government  officials  and  experts  looked  to  continental  Europe, 
especially Germany for the science of forestry, through which they absorbed its 
protectionist philosophy. All this meant centralisation in policy making and the 
growth of forests under the control of the central government, which was a clear 
departure from Tokugawa governance tradition.   
 
In practice, however, what occupied a central place in government policy making 
was to promote commercially viable plantation forestry. It simply endorsed the 
tendency  towards  coniferous  plantations  that  had  been  taking  place  from  late 
Tokugawa times. Moreover, as the Meiji era progressed, the government’s forestry 
bureau began to rely more on hands off than on hands on measures. Although the 
Meiji  Forest  Law  gave  a  secondary  importance  to  traditional  institutional 
frameworks,  especially  century old  ‘shared yield  forest  contracts’,  the  late Meiji 
government re discovered it as an effective means of promoting afforestation in the 
state  sector  and  also  in  forest  areas  owned  by  local  authorities  and  private 
landlords.  And  this  functioned  well,  just  as  the  system  had  worked  for  local 
daimyo owned forestland in the late Tokugawa period.69 
 
All  this,  however,  should  not  be  taken  to  imply  that  the  role  of  the  central 
government became all important in modern Japanese forest management. First 
of all, there was a shift within the state sector: the gravity of regenerative forestry 
shifted  from  forests  owned  by  the  state  to  those  managed  by  prefectural 
governments and also to those owned by village authorities. Second, in the private 
sector too, afforestation advanced with reversed, rising trends in relative prices of 
both timber and charcoal up to 1922, the year that marked the end of a wartime 
boom70.  Intensive  methods  of  afforestation  originated  in  Yoshino  defused  over 
remote  regions  of  the  country,  which  now  gained—thanks  to  the  coming  of 
railways—better transport access to metropolitan markets. It is true that it was 
                                                 
68  Kume (2002), III, pp.270 271. 
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pp.263 277. 
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areas  of  publicly owned  forests  where  such  intensive  methods  were  initially 
adopted, and that the level of progress in the private sector of the interwar period 
was stagnant as relative prices of timber fell. However, their advance made in the 
period before the 1920s should not be underestimated71.   
 
Third, the expansion of charcoal producing districts should also be noted. Unlike 
firewood,  charcoal  in  Japan  before  the  Second  World  War  was  a  commodity  of 
comparatively high income elasticity. For the period before the First World War 
especially,  it  stood  at  0.5  as  against  0.1  for  firewood  (the  elasticity  of  0.5  is 
comparable to that of construction timber for the same period)72. As income levels 
rose and urbanisation proceeded, therefore, the demand for charcoal increased, 
which in turn sent a signal to some districts that more gains would be made by 
specialising in burning charcoal and, hence, in cultivating particular kinds of wood 
suitable  for  charcoal  making.  Moreover,  some  of  traditional  industries  such  as 
sericulture,  demands  for  its  industrial  use  increased  in  initial  phases  of 
development73. Thus, in the production of charcoal too, the linkage between market 
demand and regenerative forestry went hand in hand, and it is worth reiterating 
that it had already started in the hinterlands of cities from the late Tokugawa 
period. 
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
 
Ken Pomeranz argued, based on a comparison between China and France, that 
early  modern  East  Asia’s  forest  degradation  was  ‘not  much  worse’  than  in 
eighteenth century western Europe, and the foregoing observation made in terms 
the  population  elasticity  of  deforestation  with  Japan  and  England  added  has 
revealed  that  the  elasticity  values  for  Tokugawa  Japan  and  Qing  China  were 
certainly not much worse than those for England and France in roughly the same 
period. This may be taken to imply that Pomeranz was right. 
 
However, there are a couple of caveats to be made. First, the observation in this 
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paper with respect to the population elasticity of deforestation should not be taken 
to mean that, as Pomeranz seems to have implied, both East Asia and Europe were 
ecologically  seriously  constrained  in  the  eighteenth  century.  As  we  have  seen, 
forest  depletion  in  England  and  France  was  far  more  precipitous  in  earlier 
centuries, and Western Europe in the eighteenth century was in the middle of the 
process  from  deforestation  to  afforestation.  Second,  as  far  as  the  East  Asian 
countries are concerned, it is evident that stabilising as well as destabilising forces 
were  operating  during  the  early  modern  period,  and  that  market  linkages  are 
likely to have exerted under certain circumstances positive influences on forest 
management and the advance of regenerative forestry. Divergence took place in the 
nineteenth century and widened thereafter in this area of forest history. In the 
West,  deforestation  was  associated  with  pre modern  economic  growth.  And  the 
substitution of minerals and fossil energy for forest resources, on the one hand, and 
the rise of a new environmental thinking, on the other, led the way to reforesting 
Europe  in  the  modern  period.  In  contrast,  China’s  pre modern  systems  of 
regenerative forestry collapsed, which resulted in uncontrolled deforestation in the 
post imperial  period.  It  is  probably  not  because  her  resource  substitution  was 
delayed,  but  because  something  more  fundamental  collapsed  at  the  end  of  the 
imperial era, which in turn affected the economic and social aspects of people’s 
living seriously. On the other hand, only Japan saw afforestation taking hold and 
its systems established in an early modern setting. But it was not because, as John 
Richards tried to argue, the state took strict restrictive measures to promote a 
regenerative  mode  of  forestry,  but  because  market  linkages  worked  for 
regenerative forestry to be commercially viable. Institutions that emerged during 
the early modern period were a product of processes in which both governments 
and local entrepreneurs played a part. It was those early modern institutions, as 
well as intensive methods of afforestation, that kept the country’s forest cover from 
degradation throughout the modern period.   
 
Finally,  a  few  more  points  may  be  made  for  environmental  history.  Whenever 
global comparisons are attempted with respect to forests, geographical factors such 
as  geology  and  climate  should  be  taken  into  consideration.  To  be  sure,  one 
important reason why Japan is still so green is that a combination of temperature, 
humidity,  and  landforms  allows—unless deforestation  is  not followed  by  severe   32 
erosion—woodland  to  rejuvenate  itself  without  much  human  intervention,  in 
contrast  with  north  and  north western  Europe  whose  average  temperature  is 
much lower and whose surface cover was stripped off by late Pleistocene glaciers. 
This must certainly have acted as a favourable factor for daimyo managed forestry 
which relied entirely on natural regeneration in the Tokugawa period. At the same 
time, however, such factors are unable to explain the differences that took place 
between  Japan  and  south  China  from  the  nineteenth  century  onwards.  Both 
regions share much the same flora, climate. Wet rice is the principal component of 
farming activity in the East Asian temperate zone. Evergreen broadleafs such as 
camellia, shii (Shiia sieboldii) and camphor tree are a common characteristic, while 
China’s Cunninghamia is similar to Japanese conifers such as cryptomeria and 
cypress  (sugi  and  hinoki).  Divergence  in  East  Asian  forest  history,  therefore, 
cannot be accounted for by geographical factors.   
 
Furthermore,  Japan’s  comparatively  better  performance  in  keeping  forest 
depletion  in  check  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  it  was  costless  even  in 
environmental terms. One obvious cost the Japanese paid is that the woodland 
became much less diverse. Now there are far more conifer plantations than it may 
have been if no human intervention had been made. It is the end product of a long 
historical  process  of  felling  old growth  stands  of  broadleafs  and  planting  more 
homogeneous  species  of  cryptomeria  and  cypress  instead.  According  to  the 
estimates by Himiyama et al., 44 per cent of the country’s forestland in circa 1850 
was covered by broadleaved woodlands, 38 per cent in 1950, and only 21 per cent in 
1985. What increased instead was ‘mixed’ areas of a 2 km mesh, but a majority of 
those  areas were mixed with small scale  conifer  plantations.  Since most of  the 
broadleaf woods had been ‘natural forests’, a shift was away from natural growth 
to  artificial  planting 74.  Indeed,  this  shift  must  have  already  started  in  the 
Tokugawa period. According to an account of one district in the Inland Sea region, 
a  list  of  trees  in  the  1720s  included  red  pine,  evergreen  oak,  maple, podocarp, 
chestnut, cherry as well as cryptomeria, cypress, and another kind of conifer, Tsuga 
(northern Japanese hemlock), a diversity of tree species75. Although this particular 
area was denuded by the mid nineteenth century with only scattered stands of red 
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pine and Japanese hemlock left, other similar areas in regions not far from Osaka 
and Kyoto must have been simply replaced by conifer plantations. There was a 
countervailing force operating; it was an expansion of small scale woodlands of oak 
(kunugi and konara) in districts of commercially oriented charcoal making. The 
total  area  was  expanding  but  could  not  counterbalance  the  strong  growth  of 
coniferous plantation forests76. 
 
Unlike  broadleaved  woodlands,  coniferous  plantations  are  monocultures.  While 
intensive forestry of cryptomeria and cypress plantations played a crucial role in 
keeping the nation’s forest cover more or less intact, there must be some negative 
effect  of  having such monocultures  around  our  living  space. How such  adverse 
effects  interacted  with  changing  economic  and  market  circumstances  and  with 
changing standards of our life in our past, we have to await further research by 
environmental historians.   
 
To conclude, while there was a sharp contrast between China and Western Europe, 
Japan was also in marked contrast with both China and the West. The observed 
contrasts  are  believed  to  have  reflected  differences  in  the  ways  in  which  the 
sustainability of the forest resource base was sought in both early modern and 
modern periods, and differences in the ways in which ‘tradition’ played a role in the 
process of transition to modernity.   
 
                                                 
76  Totman notes that since the climax of a natural succession in a temperate climate 
of the Japanese archipelago is broadleaved forest growth, ‘even where governments 
vigorously promoted afforestation, and except in plantation stands, mixed forests 
came to dominate the mountains of Tokugawa Japan’ (1989, p.182). Given what 
happened after Meiji, however, this is too optimistic an assessment.   34 
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Table 1    Population and Forest Area estimates for England, France, Lingnan, 
south China, and Japan, 1000 1985 
 















































































Notes on sources: 
England 
1.  Population figures for 1086, 1350 and 1992 are from Henderson Howat (1996),   40 
pp.23 24; 1688 and 1871 from Wrigley and Schofield (1981), pp.531 535. 
2.  All forest figures are from Henderson Howat (1996), pp.23 24, except for 1871, 
which is taken from Coppock (1973), p.623. Figures for 1086, 1350 and 1688 
are calculated from percentages forested, the first two of which are believed 
to have been based on Rackham (1990), pp.50 51, 55. 
France: 
3.  Both population and forest area figures are from Morin (1996), p.19. 
Japan 
4.  Population for 1600 is a provisional estimate by O. Saito, the 1850 estimate 
from Miyamoto (2004), and the other figures from Kokuritsu Shakai Hoshō 
Jinkō Mondai Kenkyūjo (2004), pp.8 10. 
5.  For estimate of forest area in 1600, see text. Other estimates are from 
Nishikawa et al. (1995), ch.1, pp.4, 6, 8, 10. 
Lingnan 
6.  Population figures are from Marks (1998), pp.158, 280. 1700 and 1937 are 
interpolated from other benchmark years. 
7.  Forest areas are Ling Daxie’s estimates quoted in Pomeranz (2000), 
pp.309 310. 1700 and 1937 are calculated from the percentages forested. 
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Table 2    Proportion forested (%)             
                                       
  Japan  Lingnan  England  France 











Mid 19th century  69  25  4  14 
Early 20th century  65  7  —  19 
Late 20th century  67  —  7  27 
       
Source: Table 1 above. 
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Table 3    Per capita forestland (ha)             
         
  Japan  Lingnan  England  France 











Mid 19th century  0.8  0.3  0.02  0.3 
Early 20th century  0.6  0.06  —  0.3 
Late 20th century  0.2  —  0.02  0.3 
         
Source: Table 1 above.   43 
 
Table 4    Chaging population elasticities of deforestation,   
in Japan, Lingnan, England and France 


























































Source: Table 1 above.   44 
 




















Japan Lingnan England France
 
Source: Table 4. 
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(‘000 silver kan) 
Share 
(%) 
Agricultural products and processed goods 
Grain 
Other agricultural products 
Cloth 
Tatami and mats 









































Source: Oishi (1975), pp.154 167. 
Notes: 
1.  ‘Grain’ does not include tax rice transported to Osaka by daimyo 
administrations. It amounted to nearly two thirds of the total merchandise 
listed above. 
2.  In the ‘share’ column, the sum of percentages may not equal to 100 because of 
rounding. 
3.  This table differs from a similar table in Hauser (1974), p.28, and another in 
Shimbo and Hasegawa (2004), p.172. Hauser’s table does not include grain in 
the total, while Shimbo and Hasegawa’s seems to have adopted somewhat 
different grouping criteria for commodities (for example, their ‘forest products’ 
are too small).   46 
 
Figure 3    Relative prices of raw silk, fuel and timber (relative to the general price 







1720 1740 1760 1780 1800 1820 1840 1860 1880
Raw silk Fuel Timber
 
Source: Miyamoto (2004), pp.139 141.   
Notes:   
1.  Benchmark years are as follows: 
1729 (trough), 1739 (peak), 1770 (trough), 1785 (peak), 1820 (trough), 1838 
(peak), 1854 (trough), 1865 (peak). 
2.  Price indices are averaged over five years centring on the benchmark year. 
The ‘fuel’ price index is an average of firewood and charcoal indices. For the 
calculation of the general price index, see Miyamoto (2004), pp.121 122. 
 